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Abstract
The authors empirically measure Canadian bond market liquidity using a number of indicators
proposed in the literature and detail, for the ﬁrst time, price and trade dynamics in the
Government of Canada secondary bond market. They ﬁnd, consistent with Inoue (1999), that the
Canadian brokered interdealer ﬁxed-income market is relatively liquid for its size. Liquidity
measures are analyzed relative to each other and across securities, and intraday patterns are
identiﬁed. The authors’ results show that trading activity is positively correlated with price
volatility, and that signed order ﬂow is signiﬁcant in explaining contemporaneous high-frequency
price movements. They ﬁnd evidence that trading activity is positively related to liquidity
measures in some markets, which suggests that indicators such as trade frequency and trading
volume, despite certain drawbacks, can be seen as useful proxies for liquidity. The authors also
document Canadian participants’ prevalent use of an order expansion protocol, whereby order
size can be negotiated upward once a trade has been initiated; although Boni and Leach (2002)
identify this practice as consistent with a market where there is relatively strong concern
regarding information asymmetry, the authors observe no consistent link between the frequency
of its use and observations of trading activity, market liquidity, or price volatility.
JEL classiﬁcation: G10, G14
Bank classiﬁcation: Financial markets; Market structure and pricing
Résumé
Les auteurs mesurent empiriquement la liquidité du marché obligataire canadien au moyen d’un
certain nombre d’indicateurs proposés dans la littérature et rendent compte, pour la première fois,
de la dynamique des prix et des transactions sur le marché secondaire des obligations du
gouvernement du Canada. Ils constatent, à l’instar d’Inoue (1999), que le marché canadien des
opérations sur titres à revenu ﬁxe conclues par l’entremise de courtiers intermédiaires est
relativement liquide pour sa taille. Ils comparent les mesures de la liquidité entre elles et entre les
divers titres, et mettent en évidence leurs proﬁls intrajournaliers de variation. Les résultats
obtenus indiquent que l’activité du marché est corrélée positivement avec la volatilité des prix et
que le ﬂux d’ordres (la somme des transactions effectuées à l’initiative de l’acheteur diminuée des
transactions faites à l’initiative du vendeur) permet d’expliquer les mouvements de prix
contemporains à fréquence élevée. Les auteurs observent une relation positive entre l’activité et
les mesures de la liquidité sur certains marchés, ce qui donne à penser que les indicateurs comme
la fréquence et le volume des transactions, malgré certaines lacunes, peuvent être utilisés pourvi
représenter la liquidité. Ils notent également l’utilisation répandue chez les participants canadiens
d’un protocole d’expansion des ordres, en vertu duquel la taille d’un ordre peut être négociée à la
hausse une fois la transaction amorcée. Bien que Boni et Leach (2002) estiment cette pratique
compatible avec un marché caractérisé par un degré relativement élevé d’asymétrie d’information,
les auteurs ne décèlent aucun lien systématique entre sa fréquence d’utilisation et le niveau
observé de l’activité, de la liquidité du marché ou de la volatilité des prix.
Classiﬁcation JEL : G10, G14
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Marchés ﬁnanciers; Structure de marché et ﬁxation des prix1
1. Introduction
Studies of market liquidity have tended to focus on conditions in foreign exchange and equity
markets. This may be due in part to the availability of high-frequency data in these markets.
Recently, several empirical studies of liquidity and intraday price dynamics in the U.S.
government securities market have used data from GovPX, a system that reports on activity in the
U.S. interdealer broker (IDB) debt market.1 CanPX, a similar transparency system recently
introduced for Canadian debt markets, makes possible an examination of liquidity in the Canadian
government securities market. In this preliminary study, we analyze intraday trade and quotation
data for 250 trading days over the period from 25 February 2002 to 27 February 2003.
The results reveal a relatively transparent, active, and liquid market, but one where liquidity is
variable and concentrated in a small number of benchmark securities. We conﬁrm the ﬁndings of
other studies that ﬁnd a link between trading activity and contemporaneous price changes. In
comparison with the signiﬁcantly more liquid U.S. Treasury market, we ﬁnd that Canadian
dealers use strategies more frequently to limit their exposure to the effects of information
asymmetry.
Why should we care about liquidity in ﬁxed-income markets? Some research has indicated that
market liquidity has a positive, ﬁrst-order impact on asset returns (e.g., Amihud, Mendelson, and
Lauterbach 1997; Datar, Naik, and Radcliffe 1998). Government debt managers are very
interested in fostering market liquidity to minimize the cost of public funds, particularly in
countries where government borrowing needs are (or have been) declining. Also, market crises
are often characterized by a sharp reduction in liquidity. By contributing to a deeper
understanding of liquidity, an important objective of this type of research is to help promote high-
quality, efﬁcient, and resilient markets.
Although much has been written on liquidity and high-frequency price dynamics in equity
markets in particular, there is good reason to believe that the results of these studies may not be
entirely applicable to debt markets, because they have signiﬁcant structural differences (Gravelle
2002). Given the size and importance of ﬁxed-income markets globally, and the recent availability
of detailed intraday data, this apparent gap in the ﬁnance literature has interested a number of
researchers. Wholesale ﬁxed-income markets are also interesting to study, because they typically
do not require explicit continuous market presence or have rules that limit the size of bid-ask
spreads or price changes; since prices and quotes are allowed to adjust endogenously, these
1. Examples of these studies include Fleming (1997, 2001, and 2002), Fleming and Remolona (1999),
Furﬁne and Remolona (2001), Elton and Green (1998), Boni and Leach (2002), Chordia, Sarkar, and
Subrahmanyam (2003), Brandt and Kavajecz (2003), Strebulaev (2002), Green (2003), Cohen and
Shin (2003), Fleming and Sarkar (1999), Ng, Leng, and Phuah(2001), and Goldreich, Hanke, and
Nath (2002).2
markets may be a good proving ground for market microstructure hypotheses. Although studies of
conditions in the intraday U.S. Treasury markets have revealed a great deal about those markets,
this paper represents the ﬁrst such examination of the smaller market in Canada.
Since liquidity is an important characteristic of markets, which measures of liquidity are most
appropriate? In ﬁxed-income markets, poor data availability has led to a focus on aggregate
activity measures, such as trading volume. It is clear, however, that market activity is at best an
indirect indicator of trading costs. At worst, activity measures such as trading volume can be
misleading, since a high level of market activity is associated not only with liquid and well-
functioning markets, but also with episodes of volatility, uncertainty, and turbulence.
Using a new data set, we construct and evaluate a range of activity and liquidity indicators for the
Canadian government bond market: bid-ask spreads, trading volume, trade frequency, quote size,
trade size, and price-impact coefﬁcients.2 We propose two new liquidity measures based on
participants’ use of the limit order expansion protocol, whereby the initial counterparties (and
subsequently other dealers) are allowed to negotiate order size upward once a trade at a given
price has been initiated.
Our investigation of price-impact coefﬁcients is related to market microstructure research that has
explored the link between signed order ﬂow (deﬁned as buyer-initiated trades minus seller-
initiated trades) and contemporaneous price changes. In markets where some participants possess
private information, this information is incorporated into prices through trading. The greater the
information asymmetry, the larger the effect of trading activity on prices (Green 2003). Although
we might traditionally think of information asymmetry and the effects of adverse selection on
liquidity in the context of opportunistic trading by equity market “insiders,” recent studies
indicate that orders contain signiﬁcant price information even in markets where prices are
putatively driven by public (macroeconomic) news announcements, such as ﬁxed-income and
foreign exchange markets (see Evans and Lyons 2002; Fleming 2001). In particular, dealers’
proprietary knowledge of customer order ﬂow and of differences in interpretation regarding
public news have been suggested as potential sources of asymmetric information in these markets.
In evaluating the proposed measures, we analyze the correlation coefﬁcients between them, and
the price volatility. We observe that while trading volume and trade frequency often exhibit the
expected correlation with other measures, they are also positively correlated with price volatility,
limiting their potential usefulness.
Quote size and trade size seem to be more appropriate measures, because they are not positively
related to price volatility; however, in addition to some conceptual problems, their correlation
2. Price-impact coefﬁcients as suggested by Kyle (1985).3
with other measures tends to be weak and/or inconsistent across securities. Only the bid-ask
spread and the two estimated price-impact coefﬁcient measures consistently exhibit the expected
relationships with each other, and, in almost all cases, with respect to volatility and the other
liquidity measures. The bid-ask spread’s strong relationship with the more sophisticated price-
impact coefﬁcient measures provides some evidence that it is the most appropriate of the intraday
indicators evaluated in this paper.
We ﬁnd that our two measures based on trade-size expansion exhibit no consistent relationships
with the other activity and liquidity measures (except for average trade size), nor with price
volatility, which suggests that participants’ use of this practice cannot be viewed simply as a
reaction by risk-averse dealers to relatively volatile and/or illiquid market conditions.
We also explore the question: How liquid is the Canadian IDB market? We ﬁnd that the Canadian
brokered interdealer ﬁxed-income market is relatively liquid for its size, consistent with survey
results presented by Inoue (1999); we identify several interesting differences with the much larger
(although structurally similar) U.S. Treasury market. In comparing our results with those of Boni
and Leach (2002) and Fleming (2001) for the U.S. Treasury market, we observe that Canadian
dealers post smaller quotes and make greater use of the order expansion protocol.
2. Measures of Liquidity
Liquidity is an elusive and multi-faceted concept. A popular deﬁnition of a liquid market is that
participants can rapidly execute large transactions with only a small impact on prices. Market
liquidity is usually considered according to at least one of four dimensions: tightness, depth,
immediacy, and resiliency. Tightness is the difference between buy and sell prices, or the bid-ask
spread. Depth denotes the size of transaction that can be absorbed without affecting prices, or the
amount of orders on the order books at a given time. Immediacy is the speed with which orders
are ﬁlled. Resiliency is the speed or ease with which prices return to “normal” following a
temporary order imbalance (CGFS 1999).
These deﬁnitions of liquidity are intuitively and theoretically appealing, but only rarely directly
observable in markets. Usually, data limitations force us to look at indirect proxies for liquidity
that may be less appropriate. This has been especially true for ﬁxed-income markets, which have
tended to be decentralized and opaque.4
2.1 Trading volume
Trading volume, or the total value of securities traded per unit of time, is an intuitive and widely
cited measure of market liquidity. In general, markets that have a relatively large amount of
trading activity are considered to be the most liquid, with the lowest per-unit trading costs. This
seems to correspond very well with observations regarding the relative liquidity of various
markets, such as, for example, benchmark vs. non-benchmark bonds, listed vs. unlisted stocks, or
U.S. dollar-euro vs. U.S. dollar-Canadian dollar foreign exchange trading. As an indirect measure
of liquidity, however, trading volume is potentially problematic. Theoretical studies have
established the positive link between trading volume and liquidity, suggesting that higher trading
volume is associated with greater market liquidity. One drawback of trading volume as a liquidity
indicator is that it is also associated with price volatility (Andersen 1996; Karpoff 1987), which is
thought in turn to be negatively related to market liquidity.
Note also that trading volume, in addition to reﬂecting market activity with respect to the number
of trades experienced, includes effects from any changes in trade size, a measure of liquidity in its
own right.
Trading volume has had mixed empirical results as a proxy for market liquidity. Fleming (2001)
ﬁnds that trading volume is negatively correlated with the bid-ask spread and positively correlated
with trade size, which suggests that a higher trading volume is associated with greater liquidity.
He also ﬁnds, however, that trading volume is negatively correlated with quote size and positively
correlated with the price-impact coefﬁcient and the on-the-run/off-the-run yield spread, which
implies that a higher trading volume is associated with lower liquidity.
2.2 Trade frequency
Closely related to trading volume, trade frequency, or the number of trades observed per unit of
time, is another indirect measure for liquidity. High trading frequency may reﬂect a more liquid
market, but it may also be associated with increased price volatility, which is in turn associated
with reduced liquidity. Since it does not include any effects from changes in trade size, however,
we might think of trade frequency as a “purer” measure of market activity than trading volume.
Huang, Cai, and Wang (2001) ﬁnd that trade frequency is more highly correlated with Treasury
volatility than is trading volume. Fleming (2001) notes that trading volume has little incremental
explanatory power over trade frequency in explaining price changes.5
2.3 Bid-ask spread
The bid-ask spread, or the difference between the best bid and offer prices, is a commonly used
measure for market liquidity. One-half of the bid-ask spread (i.e., the difference between the price
of each quote and the midpoint of the two prices) can be thought of as a directly observable (but
not the only) estimate of the cost of execution. In practice, a market that has very low transaction
costs is characterized as liquid. In this sense, the bid-ask spread is a relatively direct measure of
market liquidity. One limitation of the bid-ask spread is that a spread is good for only a speciﬁc set
of bid and ask quantities. Where quantities bid and offered vary over time and across securities,
observed bid-ask spreads are not truly comparable.
The general absence of rules in institutional over-the-counter (OTC) debt markets regarding
minimum tick sizes, maximum bid-ask spreads, or market presence allows the bid-ask spread to
adjust more endogenously than in many equity markets. Where there is no specialist with the task
of maintaining a smooth, two-sided market for a particular security, participants are free to post or
withdraw quotes as they see ﬁt, allowing spreads to ﬂuctuate in response to new information and
changes in underlying supply and demand.
In addition to its theoretic and intuitive appeal as a relatively “direct” measure of transaction
costs, Fleming (2001) identiﬁes the bid-ask spread as one of the most appropriate liquidity
indicators for the U.S. Treasury market due to its high degree of correlation with other (perhaps
more sophisticated) measures, such as price impact and benchmark/non-benchmark yield spreads.
2.4 Quote size
Quote size is an appealing proxy for market depth. Often, however, only the inside quotes at the
best bid and ask prices are visible, leaving the rest of the order book effectively invisible to
observers. Unfortunately, CanPX captures and stores data relating only to the inside quotes.
Furthermore, the observed quote size underestimates true market depth where participants may
actually be willing to transact more than they explicitly quote; for instance, in markets that allow
order size expansion once a trade has been initiated (the “workup,” described in section 2.6), such
as the Canadian IDBs.
2.5 Trade size
Trade size is another measure of market depth. Although it does not reveal the depth of liquidity
faced by market participants ex ante, as an ex post measure of realized depth it may be a more
appropriate indicator if participants do not reveal their true trading intentions in their posted6
quotes. In our study, trade size reﬂects the amount that was actually traded at the bid or ask, and
includes any negotiations over size that may have taken place once the initial quote was hit or
lifted. A comparison of the average trade size and average quote size for a particular security may
indicate the relative importance of this practice.
2.6 Participants’ use of order expansion (the “workup”)3
The Canadian brokered interdealer debt markets feature a practice (little-used outside of IDB debt
markets) known as the “workup.” When a quote is “hit” or “lifted,” the workup protocol allows
further negotiations over size to take place. At each stage of the negotiation, each participant
retains right-of-refusal with respect to further size expansion, and trade size continues to grow
until underlying demand on one side or the other has been met. Furthermore, once the trade has
been initiated, the associated quote begins to ﬂash on the broker’s screen, alerting other
participants on the system that a trade is in progress. Once the initial buyer’s and/or seller’s
demand has been satisﬁed, other dealers are allowed to step in and trade at that price.
One explanation for this practice is that it allows participants to minimize information leakage
with respect to their true trading desires. Instead of posting a large quote (which could move the
market price against them), the dealer posts a small initial quote, subsequently revealing their true
demand only incrementally, and only to the prospective counterparty. The trade size expansion
protocol may also serve to limit expected costs with respect to stale quotes: if markets move
quickly and a participant suddenly ﬁnds their quote on the wrong side of the market price, their
obligation to trade is limited. As Boni and Leach (2002) suggest, participants might be expected
to make relatively greater use of trade size expansion under relatively illiquid (or otherwise
adverse) market conditions, when concerns regarding information leakage and stale quotes may
be at their highest.
We propose two liquidity measures based on participants’ use of the order expansion protocol: (i)
the proportion of total trades that have undergone size expansion, and (ii) the proportion of total
trading volume from trades that have undergone size expansion.
2.7 Price-impact coefﬁcients
Kyle (1985) develops a model to address the strategic aspects of informed trading in a market
microstructure model. Informed traders in the model can be thought of as information
monopolists who act to exploit this advantage. The model is able to characterize how an informed
3. Boni and Leach (2002) provide an excellent description of the right-of-refusal limit order expansion
protocol in the interdealer U.S. Treasury market.7
trader would choose to transact in order to maximize the value of private information. The price-
impact coefﬁcient in the model reﬂects how much the market adjusts prices to reﬂect the
information content of trades. It measures “the rise (fall) in price that typically occurs with a
buyer-initiated (seller-initiated) trade” (Fleming 2001). Kyle’s price-impact coefﬁcient can be
used to characterize liquidity in ﬁnancial markets. It is generally felt that liquid markets are those
that accommodate trades with the least impact on prices. The intuition is that directional trades
will be associated with a larger movement in prices when markets are illiquid (i.e., market depth is
lower). We estimate price impact by regressing log changes in price on one of two measures for
net trading (NT) activity over a 5-minute interval:
. (1)
Net trading activity is proxied by (i) the volume of buyer-initiated trades minus the volume of
seller-initiated trades, and (ii) the number of buyer-initiated trades minus the number of seller-
initiated trades over the 5-minute interval.
One drawback of the price-impact coefﬁcient is that, although it necessitates the use of detailed
high-frequency data, it is estimated over a longer sample period (weekly or yearly). The estimated
price-impact coefﬁcients therefore cannot be used directly in an analysis of intraday market
conditions, unlike the ﬁve indicators discussed earlier. However, by analyzing the relationships
between the ﬁve more traditional measures of liquidity discussed earlier and these more model-
based ones, we may be able to gain some insight into the appropriateness of our high-frequency
indicators.
3. The Government of Canada Securities Markets and the Role of
Interdealer Brokers
The market for Government of Canada securities is the largest market in Canada, with
$270 billion (par value) in bonds and $105 billion in treasury bills outstanding as of 31 March
2003. Like the government securities markets in most countries, the market for Government of
Canada securities is primarily wholesale and institutional, where a small number of professional
participants (typically, traders employed by securities dealers, pension funds, and mutual funds)
conduct very large trades (often in excess of $25 or $50 million) on an infrequent basis. The
market is currently divided into three segments: the primary market, the customer-dealer market,
and the interdealer market.
In the primary market, the Bank of Canada conducts regular auctions of securities on behalf of the
Department of Finance according to a pre-announced calendar. A group of dealers known as
Pt () Pt 1 – () log – log b0 b1 NTt ´e t ++ =8
government securities dealers (GSDs) are granted direct access to these auctions. A subset of the
largest GSDs, known as primary dealers, have minimum bidding obligations at these auctions
based on their level of activity and participation in the market. Institutional investors (i.e.,
“customers”) may participate at these auctions by submitting their bids through one or more
GSDs.
In the customer-dealer market, institutional investors typically trade with securities dealers on a
bilateral, OTC basis over the telephone. The results of these bilateral customer-dealer trades are
known only to the two counterparties, an opacity that is seen by participants as necessary to limit
the price-impact costs of large trades.4
3.1 The interdealer market
Given the large and unpredictable inventory shocks typically faced by dealers in their trades with
customers, interdealer debt markets have developed to facilitate inventory management and risk-
sharing. Traditionally, interdealer trading has been conducted in a bilateral, telephone-based
market, which is still typical in the customer-dealer market.
The introduction of IDBs has signiﬁcantly reduced the role of bilateral interdealer trading in
recent years. The current Canadian IDBs are screen-based voice brokers, which allow dealers to
trade anonymously with each other. Each participant has a screen where bids, offers, and trade
outcomes are posted. Participants post quotes and make trades by communicating with the broker
over the telephone.
Based on dealer statistics reported to the Investment Dealers Association (IDA), the Canadian
interdealer debt market represented approximately 46 per cent of the total secondary Government
of Canada bond market trading volume in 2002, of which IDB trading accounted for 86 per cent
(up from 50 per cent in 1991 and 75 per cent in 1997). This is comparable with the U.S. Treasury
market, where the interdealer market accounted for 50 per cent of activity in 1997, of which
trading on IDBs has been estimated to represent between 90 and 99 per cent (Gravelle 2002).
As stated earlier, an important feature of IDB trading is that, although a trade must occur at the
last quoted price after the trade has been initiated, the size of the trade is subject to negotiation if
both parties are willing. In addition, once other IDB participants become aware through the
system that a trade has been initiated at a particular price, they may join in (on either side of the
trade) after the trading needs of the original buyer or seller have been met. This is the “workup”
process described in section 2.6; it continues until either total buying or selling interest with
4. More recently, electronic platforms have been introduced inCanada that offer simultaneous multiple-
dealer quote inquiries and trading in one case, and peer-to-peer, order-driven trading inanother.9
respect to that trade has been satisﬁed. As Table 21 shows, order expansion beyond the initial
quoted amount is far from uncommon. Table 21 also compares the average elapsed trading time,
in seconds, for trades that have undergone size expansion and those that have not. For example, a
trade in the 2-year benchmark without order expansion beyond the initial quoted amount requires
an average of approximately 15 seconds (from the time that the initial quote is hit or lifted to the
time that the ﬁnal trade size is reported), whereas a trade that does undergo size expansion
requires an average of 30 seconds.
4. Data and Sample Period
CanPX is a data service that consolidates and disseminates the trade and quotation data submitted
by Canada’s ﬁxed-income IDBs. Introduced by Canada’s IDBs and securities dealers to improve
transparency in ﬁxed-income markets, CanPX has been in operation since the summer of 2001,
with the exception of the ﬁve and one-half month period immediately following 11 September
2001. Our sample covers the period from 25 February 2002 to 27 February 2003.
Each ﬁle from CanPX represents a record of the trade and quotation information presented on the
screens of the four IDBs in the Canadian market over a portion or all of a given trading day.5 Each
line in the ﬁle is a “snapshot” of information that relates to a particular security at a precise
moment in time: the price and/or yield of the best bid and offer (if any); the total amount offered
and bid at each of the best inside quotes (across all of the IDB screens); the time at which the best
bid and offer were last updated; whether a buyer-initiated or seller-initiated trade is currently
being conducted; and, when a trade is completed, the trade outcome and the name of the IDB
where the trade took place. The raw data set contains signiﬁcant repetition and some data-entry
errors which must be ﬁltered prior to performing our analysis; the ﬁltering methodology is
described in Appendix A.
The CanPX data set is relatively complete in that it receives information from all of the Canadian
IDBs (representing approximately 46 per cent of the total secondary Government of Canada bond
market). By contrast, the U.S. Treasury market’s GovPX system does not receive data from
Cantor Fitzgerald, the IDB thought to be most active in the 30-year maturity sector. The CanPX
data set, however, does not include information on the Canadian IDB “roll” markets, where
dealers trade one security for another on a spread basis. Although this type of trading is thought to
be more prevalent for treasury bills than for bonds, it represents a potentially signiﬁcant amount
of unseen trading activity in the interdealer bond market.
5. Overour sample period, the four Canadian IDBs are Freedom International Brokerage Company,
Prebon Yamane(Canada) Ltd., Shorcan Brokers Limited, and Tullett Liberty (Canada) Ltd.10
In this study, we focus on benchmark Government of Canada bonds in the 2-, 5-, 10-, and 30-year
sectors, the securities most actively quoted and traded on IDB markets. The benchmark for a
given sector is the most recently issued security with a cumulative issue size over a certain
threshold. The identity of the benchmark bond in each maturity sector changes periodically as old
securities move out of the maturity sector and new securities are issued to take their places. As
discussed in Appendix A, we follow convention in our identiﬁcation of the benchmarks based on
the Government of Canada’s issuance calendar.
4.1 Constructing 5-minute-interval observations from continuous data
To construct the Kyle price-impact coefﬁcient, and to facilitate examination of intraday variation
in our other liquidity measures, each day is divided into 144 discrete 5-minute intervals (i.e., from
0600h to 1800h). The observation corresponding to each interval provides a “snapshot” of the
most recently updated price and quotation information over the interval, and a record of
cumulative trading and quotation activity over the previous ﬁve minutes with respect to that
particular security. Where we attempt to characterize typical intraday patterns in the variables, an
average across all of the days for each 5-minute interval is taken.
It is important to note that the ﬁltered data set contains numerous 5-minute-interval observations
(particularly at the beginning and end of the trading day) where either the last observation in the
period is a one-sided quote, or the last observation reveals neither a ﬁrm ask nor bid. In those
cases, no midpoint price is recorded for that interval. Where a midpoint price exists in both the
current and previous intervals, intraday price changes are calculated by taking the difference of
log 5-minute price observations.
5. Measuring Liquidity: Empirical Results
5.1 Liquidity indicators
5.1.1 Market activity: trading volume and trade frequency
Table 1 reports that average daily aggregate trading volume decreases with maturity for the 2-, 5-,
10-, and 30-year benchmark bonds, with the non-benchmarks lagging far behind. Among the
benchmarks, there is a wide range from the highest to the lowest average trading volume.
Table 3 shows that the most frequently traded securities are (in descending order) the 10-, 2-, 5-,
and 30-year benchmarks. Again, we ﬁnd that trading activity is highly concentrated in the current
benchmarks. The differences between sector benchmarks, however, are not as large as are found11
with trading volume. This suggests that differences in typical trade size between the sectors can
explain most of the variation in trading volume, and that the high degree of concentration in
trading volumes in the short-dated benchmark bonds may overstate the apparent differences in
activity levels. This observation of smaller typical trade sizes for longer-dated bonds makes sense,
given the increased level of interest rate risk per dollar of face value associated with a position in
a higher-duration security.
Both trading volume and trade frequency for the 2-year benchmark exhibit a clear intraday pattern
(Charts 1 and 2), with most activity occurring in the morning between 8:30 and noon, slowing
down over the lunch hour, and then picking up again modestly during the afternoon. The pattern is
similar for the 5-, 10-, and 30-year benchmarks.
Daily observations of both trading volumes and trade frequency exhibit high standard deviations
and are positively skewed, particularly for the non-benchmarks. Tables 2 and 4 show that trading
activity is positively correlated across the benchmark bonds.
Corresponding with Karpoff’s (1987) results, we ﬁnd in Tables 22 to 25 that the weekly
observations of average daily trading volume and trade frequency are positively correlated with
the weekly standard deviation of 5-minute log returns. Similar to the ﬁndings of Huang, Cai, and
Wang (2001) for the U.S. Treasury market, which show that volatility is more closely linked to
trade frequency than trading volume, we observe that the trade frequency coefﬁcients are higher
than the corresponding coefﬁcients calculated for the trading volume.6
5.1.2 Bid-ask spreads7
Table 5 reports descriptive statistics of average daily bid-ask spreads for the bonds. Note that the
observed bid-ask spreads (in dollar terms) increase with maturity for the benchmark bonds.8 In
general, average daily bid-ask spreads appear to be relatively unskewed and stable across days
compared with our two activity measures.
In Chart 3, average bid-ask spreads fall precipitously as the trading day begins, peak again twice
around 8:30 (when most economic data are released) and 10, rise to a somewhat higher level near
6. Table 19 shows that volatility is positively correlated across benchmark bonds.
7. The interdealer bid-ask spreads examined in this paper should notbe confused with the bid-ask
spreads typically quoted to institutional investors in the bilateral customer-dealer market, which
(according toanecdotal reports) tend to be narrower and more stable than those considered here.
8. Although we focus on interday and intraday variation in our indicators with respect to individual
securities, an appropriate comparison of bid-ask spreads across sectors would require that they be
expressed in yield terms (i.e., taking account of differences in duration). More generally, throughout
this section, care should be taken in interpreting differences between the results for the maturity
sectors as simple indications of relative liquidity, because such considerations have not been
accounted for.12
mid-day (the lunch hour), and then fall again to a somewhat lower level over the rest of the trading
day.
Table 6 reports that bid-ask spreads are positively correlated across the benchmark bonds. As
expected, we also ﬁnd in Tables 22 to 25 that the average bid-ask spread is positively correlated
with the daily standard deviations of 5-minute log returns (with the possible exception of the 10-
year benchmark, where the coefﬁcient is relatively small at 0.19).
5.1.3 Market depth: quote size, trade size, and the role of order expansion
Tables 7 and 9 show that the daily average quote and trade size, respectively, are largest for the 2-
year benchmark and decrease with maturity for the benchmark bonds. Average daily quote size
exhibits high standard deviations and is positively skewed, whereas deviations in average daily
trade size are relatively small for the benchmarks compared with the other measures.
Although the average ask and bid quote sizes rise at the beginning of the trading day, Charts 4 and
5 do not seem to exhibit the pronounced intraday patterns that were observed for the three
previous measures. The observed intraday pattern for average trade size (Chart 6) is more
puzzling. Average trade size tends to be higher in the morning than in the afternoon, and it reaches
its highest values very early in the morning, prior to 7:30. This may be due to the effect of a
relatively small number of large trades in the early morning, which is typically very sparse in
terms of trading activity, as Charts 1 and 2 show.
Tables 8 and 10 show that average quote and trade size, respectively, are positively correlated
across the benchmark bonds, although the relationships appear to be relatively weak compared
with the earlier measures (Tables 2, 4, and 6).
Note the large differences between average quote size and average trade size, which indicate that
increasing the size of a trade subsequent to a quote being hit (i.e., the workup) has a signiﬁcant
impact on realized depth. Tables 15 and 17 show that, for the benchmarks, from 32 per cent to
45 per cent of trades undergo size expansion through the workup, and these trades account for
from 64 per cent to 75 per cent of the total trading volume. These results suggest that quoted
amounts signiﬁcantly underestimate the amount of liquidity likely to be available at the quoted
price. In addition, there does not appear to be a consistent pattern relating participants’ use of
order expansion to maturity sector, nor to benchmark/non-benchmark status. Tables 16 and 18
show that participants’ use of order expansion is not strongly correlated across the benchmark
bonds.13
In Charts 7 and 8, we note that both the frequency of trades undergoing order expansion and the
resulting trading volume exhibit intraday patterns that are similar to those observed for trading
activity more broadly (Charts 1 and 2). Charts 9 and 10, however, show there is no clear intraday
pattern in the proportional use of the order expansion protocol.
The observed degree of reliance on order expansion in the Canadian market is much larger than
that observed by Boni and Leach (2002) for the U.S. Treasury market. For the on-the-run 5-year
Treasury note, they ﬁnd that 25.9 per cent of transactions undergo size expansion, and that these
trades make up 45.6 per cent of total trading volume. For the Canadian market, the comparable
ﬁgures are 41 per cent and 72 per cent, respectively.
Why would participants in the Canadian market utilize the workup to such a large degree
compared with the U.S. market? Boni and Leach (2002) suggest that dealers use expandible
orders to minimize the costs associated with asymmetric information. In particular, they ﬁnd that
dealers use the workup more often during relatively illiquid periods (outside of the New York
trading day) and for relatively illiquid securities (non-benchmark securities). In this context, our
ﬁnding of greater use of order expansion in the Canadian market is consistent with Canadian
dealers making greater use of a strategy that may be particularly well-suited to a market where
asymmetric information may be of greater concern. In contrast with Boni and Leach’s (2002)
results, however, we observe that order expansion is not more frequently observed for Canadian
non-benchmarks than for benchmarks, which suggests that asymmetric information may not be
the main explanation within the Canadian market.
5.1.4 Price-impact coefﬁcients
Price-impact coefﬁcients are the estimated coefﬁcients from regressions of net trading activity on
the log price changes at the 5-minute frequency. Tables 11 to 14 provide descriptive statistics of
the price-impact coefﬁcients estimated using the two measures of net trading activity: (i) the
volume of buyer-initiated trades minus the volume of seller-initiated trades, and (ii) the number of
buyer-initiated trades minus the number of seller-initiated trades over the 5-minute interval. While
nearly all price-impact coefﬁcient regressions yield estimates that are signiﬁcantly different from
zero, regressions in which the independent variable is the net number of trades have higher
explanatory power than those where the independent variable is the net volume of trades. In Table
20, price-impact coefﬁcients are estimated over the whole sample of 5-minute intervals. For the 2-
year bond, the adjusted R-square is 0.0874 in the regression employing the net number of trades,
whereas it is 0.0219 when net trading volume is substituted into the regression. In fact, for all
benchmark bonds, net number of trades performs better that net trading volume. One possible14
explanation for the large difference in explanatory power is the order expansion process that is
integral to Government of Canada securities trading. Since any buyer and seller can join in to sell
or buy a bond when a quote is “hit” or “taken” (at the agreed-upon price), the ﬁnal reported trade
volumes may no longer characterize just buyer- or seller-initiated trades.
For the magnitude of the price impact, we ﬁnd on average a price increase of 0.0063 per cent for
every net trade in the 2-year bonds, and a 0.0115, 0.0175, and 0.0196 per cent price increase for
the 5-, 10-, and 30-year benchmark bonds, respectively (Table 11). On the other hand, every
one million dollars of net trade in 2-year bonds induces a 0.0002 per cent price increase, compared
with a price impact of 0.00065 per cent for 5-year, 0.0028 per cent for 10-year, and 0.0036 per
cent for 30-year bonds (Table 13). We ﬁnd that the average price impact of a trade for the 2-year
benchmark is approximately four times the impact found by Fleming (2001). Results are similar
when regressions are conducted over the whole sample period (Table 20). Both types of estimated
price-impact coefﬁcients increase with the duration of the bond.
5.2  Evaluating the measures: correlation results
An examination of the relationships between our measures is potentially useful in evaluating their
appropriateness, because groups of measures that are consistently correlated with each other can
be seen as useful proxies for each other. To the extent that some measures are more difﬁcult to
observe than others, the ﬁnding that a readily available one is correlated with other more
sophisticated measures could have practical implications for market analysts. On the other hand,
we might become skeptical regarding the appropriateness of a measure that is not consistently
correlated with other measures, particularly if we have reason to believe a priori that some of
those measures may be more appropriate on theoretical grounds. Tables 22 to 25 provide
correlation coefﬁcients for the four benchmark bonds.
Not surprisingly, trading volume and trade frequency are strongly correlated with each other for
the four benchmarks. Trading volume can be considered a more appropriate indicator than trade
frequency, since it is more strongly and consistently correlated with trade size and quote size. This
may make sense because trading volume increases both with the number of trades (trade
frequency) and trade size (an indicator of depth). Trade frequency, on the other hand, can be
thought of as a “purer” measure of activity than trading volume, since it does not include the
impact of realized trade depth. Finally, both trading volume and trade frequency are positively
correlated with volatility, highlighting the potential ambiguity in the interpretation of heightened
trading activity. In contrast with Fleming’s (2001) results, both trading volume and trade
frequency are negatively correlated with the bid-ask spread and the two price-impact coefﬁcients15
(with the exception of trade frequency in the 2-year sector), which suggests that these “activity”
measures might be seen as useful (if perhaps somewhat ambiguous) indicators of liquidity in the
Canadian IDB market.
As noted earlier, average quote size seems to underestimate the amount of liquidity available ex
ante at the inside quotes, due to the common practice of order expansion through the “workup.”
Trade size may be a more suitable measure than quote size, since it directly reﬂects the amount of
liquidity that was available at the quoted prices, ex post. Although trade size and quote size
exhibit the expected sign of correlation with the bid-ask spread and the two price-impact
coefﬁcients, we observe that the relationships are relatively weak in some cases. Neither seems to
be positively related to volatility.
Except for average trade size, our two proposed measures based on order expansion do not exhibit
consistent correlations across the benchmark securities with respect to any of the activity or
liquidity measures, nor with volatility. In addition to suggesting that these measures are
inappropriate proxies for market liquidity, these results are in contrast to Boni and Leach’s (2002)
ﬁnding that order expansion strategies tend to be used by dealers under conditions of increased
information asymmetry in the interdealer U.S. Treasury market.
The bid-ask spread and the two price-impact estimates consistently show the expected correlation
with each other, as well as with volatility in almost all cases (i.e., except for the price-impact
estimates for the 10-year benchmark). Given this result, combined with their model-derived and
theoretic appeal as relatively direct measures of liquidity, we ﬁnd that these indicators are the
most appropriate of those considered in this study.
5.3 How liquid is the Canadian interdealer market?
Inoue (1999), using survey results from eleven countries, indicates that the Canadian debt market
is relatively liquid in terms of its turnover ratio and its interdealer bid-ask spreads.9 Having
constructed a much broader series of measures for the Canadian interdealer bond market, what do
our indicators tell us about its relative quality?
Table 26 compares the values of the liquidity measures for the 2-year benchmark with the results
from a similar study by Fleming (2001) of the interdealer U.S. Treasury markets. While we have
underscored the multifaceted (and therefore, in a sense, immeasurable) nature of market liquidity,
and the importance of the differences between markets for interpreting liquidity measures, we can
nonetheless attempt to make an intuitive comparison based on our results: In the brokered
9. Countriesthatparticipatedinthesurveyinclude:Belgium,Canada,France,Germany,Italy,Japan,the
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.16
interdealer market for Government of Canada benchmark bonds, on average, trades of one-half
the size are possible at quoted bid-ask spreads that are twice as wide, resulting in over two times
the impact on prices, when compared with the U.S. Treasury market. In addition, the amount of
market depth available ex ante seems to be less transparent in the Canadian market, due to the
relative prevalence of order size expansion.
Given its position as the largest and arguably most liquid market in the world, this ﬁnding of a
liquidity advantage for the U.S. Treasury market should not be surprising. However, the extent
and nature of these differences along the various dimensions of liquidity may tell a more
interesting story. Looking ﬁrst at our activity measures, trading volume and trade frequency
indicate approximately 20:1 and 11:1 differentials, respectively, favouring the United States for
the 2-year benchmark. Given the large difference in the amount of securities issued in the two
markets, turnover ratios (i.e., total trading volume divided by the stock of securities outstanding)
may be more comparable; Inoue (1999) ﬁnds that the U.S. and Canadian turnover ratios are nearly
identical, at 22 times and 21.9 times (putting them at third and fourth place, respectively, out of
ten countries reporting).
We ﬁnd that the average bid-ask spread for the Canadian 2-year benchmark is roughly twice that
for the United States. Recall, however, that these measures are comparable only if the quoted
amounts are equal. Since the average quote size is much smaller in Canada, the differential in bid-
ask spreads between the two markets may overstate Canada’s relative liquidity. Our estimate of
the bid-ask spread for the Canadian 2-year benchmark corresponds very closely with Inoue’s
(1999) survey result, giving Canada the second smallest bid-ask spread out of eight countries
reporting for that maturity sector.
The Canadian market’s average trade size is roughly one-half, and its average quote size
approximately one-eighth, that of the U.S. market. However, recall that quote size seems to
underestimate true market depth at the inside quotes for the Canadian market, due to frequent use
of the order expansion protocol. Trade size may therefore be a more comparable measure of
actual or realized depth.
Our ﬁndings that Canada, compared with the United States, has relatively smaller quote sizes and
a larger reliance on order size expansion indicate that the Canadian IDB market is one in which
market conditions can be quite variable. In this market, dealers can compensate for concerns
regarding information asymmetry by limiting the exposure of their trading intentions and timing
their participation strategically to take advantage of intermittent price discovery.17
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have used a new high-frequency data set to construct a series of liquidity
measures for the interdealer Government of Canada bond market, identifying intraday patterns
and evaluating them in relation to each other and in comparison with the U.S. Treasury market.
Our results suggest that bid-ask spreads and price-impact coefﬁcients are the most appropriate
indicators of those studied here, followed in approximate order by trade size, quote size, trading
volume, trade frequency, and proposed measures based on participants’ use of the order expansion
protocol.
In contrast with Fleming’s (2001) ﬁndings for the U.S. Treasury market, we ﬁnd that price-impact
coefﬁcients and the bid-ask spread are typically negatively correlated with trading volume and
trade frequency, which suggests that these latter (activity) measures may be seen as useful proxies
for liquidity in the Canadian interdealer market. Given that the activity measures may be more
easily observed than the other measures (i.e., they do not necessarily require high-frequency data),
this ﬁnding may have implications for analysts and their surveillance of Canadian market
conditions. The relationship between trading activity and price volatility may complicate the
interpretation, however, particularly if we are interested in measuring liquidity during market
crises or episodes of turbulence.
We ﬁnd that Canadian dealers post relatively small quote sizes in relation to typical trade size, and
make greater use of the order expansion protocol than dealers in the U.S. Treasury IDB market.
Corresponding with Boni and Leach’s (2002) ﬁndings, these observations are consistent with a
market where participants attempt to hide their trading intentions to limit the costs associated with
information leakage and stale quotes. We ﬁnd, however, that order expansion is not more
frequently observed for the less liquid securities, and furthermore that indicators of participants’
use of the order expansion protocol are not consistently correlated with trading activity, liquidity,
nor price volatility, which suggests that there is no simple link between concerns regarding
information asymmetry and the prevalence of this important practice in the Canadian market.
A natural extension of this work is to investigate the determinants of changes in liquidity over
time. D’Souza and Gaa (2003) explore the effect of macroeconomic announcements and
Government of Canada securities auctions on market liquidity and price dynamics, and, in
particular, the time-varying role of order expansion, which we ﬁnd to be especially important to
the Canadian market; D’Souza and Gaa employ an event study methodology to examine the
conditions surrounding instances of signiﬁcant limit order expansion.18
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Table 1: Daily Trading Volume ($ millions)
Mean Std. dev. Median 75% 25%
Old 2Y benchmark 102.12 203.59 27.00 85.50 2.00
2Y benchmark 495.62 336.40 451.50 675.00 271.00
Old 5Y benchmark 45.95 74.00 11.00 50.00 0.00
5Y benchmark 285.32 175.24 256.25 378.00 167.70
Old 10Y benchmark 8.81 13.43 1.00 12.75 0.00
10Y benchmark 193.42 123.71 182.00 255.85 110.00
Old 30Y benchmark 6.88 10.67 3.70 9.00 0.00
30Y benchmark 92.77 60.29 77.00 120.00 51.00
Notes: Trading volume is the total of buyer- and seller-initiated trades each day between 0730h and 1700h over the period
from 25 February 2002 to 27 February 2003. Benchmark Government of Canada bonds in the 2-, 5-, 10-, and 30-year sectors
are the securities that are most actively quoted and traded on IDBs.
Table 2: Correlation Coefﬁcients: Trading Volume
2-year 5-year 10-year 30-year
2-year 1.00
5-year 0.66 1.00
10-year 0.73 0.55 1.00
30-year 0.47 0.51 0.68 1.00
Note: Correlation coefﬁcients are calculated using weekly observations of average daily trading
volume over the period 25 February 2002 to 27 February 2003.21
Table 3: Trade Frequency (trades per day)
Mean Std. dev. Median 75% 25%
Old 2Y benchmark 7.32 15.06 3.00 6.00 1.00
2Y benchmark 41.67 23.58 40.00 54.00 26.00
Old 5Y benchmark 6.02 11.06 1.00 5.00 0.00
5Y benchmark 40.46 22.55 38.00 52.00 26.00
Old 10Y benchmark 1.38 1.86 1.00 2.00 0.00
10Y benchmark 42.17 24.02 40.00 55.00 28.00
Old 30Y benchmark 2.20 3.10 2.00 3.00 0.00
30Y benchmark 35.40 21.51 31.00 44.00 22.00
Note: Trade frequency is the total number of trades observed each day between 0730h and 1700h over the period from
25 February 2002 to 27 February 2003.
Table 4: Correlation Coefﬁcients: Trade Frequency
2-year 5-year 10-year 30-year
2-year 1.00
5-year 0.72 1.00
10-year 0.77 0.66 1.00
30-year 0.54 0.66 0.68 1.00
Note: Correlation coefﬁcients are calculated using weekly observations of the average number of
trades per day for the period 25 February 2002 to 27 February 2003.22
Table 5: Bid-Ask Spread (dollars per $100 face value)
Mean Std. dev. Median 75% 25%
Old 2Y benchmark 0.02919 0.01690 0.02458 0.03200 0.01941
2Y benchmark 0.02120 0.00664 0.02018 0.02419 0.01719
Old 5Y benchmark 0.05678 0.03693 0.04672 0.06678 0.03636
5Y benchmark 0.04879 0.01496 0.04668 0.05396 0.04126
Old 10Y benchmark 0.07673 0.03143 0.07185 0.10000 0.05000
10Y benchmark 0.07593 0.02200 0.07267 0.08407 0.06426
Old 30Y benchmark 0.11195 0.06937 0.09872 0.12000 0.07120
30Y benchmark 0.10912 0.02248 0.10822 0.12128 0.09559
Note: Bid-ask spread is the average difference between the best bid and offer prices on each day between 0730h and 1700h over
the period from 25 February 2002 to 27 February 2003 (see Appendix A).
Table 6: Correlation Coefﬁcients: Bid-Ask Spread
2-year 5-year 10-year 30-year
2-year 1.00
5-year 0.57 1.00
10-year 0.68 0.75 1.00
30-year 0.62 0.69 0.66 1.00
Note: Correlation coefficients are calculated using weekly observations over the period 25 February
2002 to 27 February 2003.23
Table 7: Quote Size ($ millions)—Ask & Bid
Mean Std. dev. Median 75% 25%
Old 2Y benchmark 3.60 3.28 2.41 3.70 2.00
2Y benchmark 4.34 2.24 3.80 4.58 3.24
Old 5Y benchmark 2.80 1.52 2.09 3.14 1.94
5Y benchmark 3.73 1.37 3.42 4.37 2.68
Old 10Y benchmark 1.62 0.57 1.52 1.94 1.20
10Y benchmark 2.39 0.59 2.28 2.60 2.05
Old 30Y benchmark 1.92 2.02 1.18 1.66 1.00
30Y benchmark 1.43 0.34 1.33 1.52 1.21
Note: Quote size is the total amount dealers are willing to trade at the best bid and offer prices, on average, each day between
0730h and 1700h over the period from 25 February 2002 to 27 February 2003.
Table 8: Correlation Coefﬁcients: Quote Size
2-year 5-year 10-year 30-year
2-year 1.00
5-year 0.41 1.00
10-year 0.60 0.38 1.00
30-year 0.24 0.30 0.30 1.00
Note: Correlation coefficients are calculated using weekly observations over the period 25 February
2002 to 27 February 2003.24
Table 9: Trade Size ($ millions)
Mean Std. dev. Median 75% 25%
Old 2Y benchmark 14.66 16.48 10.20 15.76 4.73
2Y benchmark 11.89 5.24 11.10 14.13 9.09
Old 5Y benchmark 10.10 9.59 6.07 11.56 4.15
5Y benchmark 7.11 2.42 6.70 8.30 5.50
Old 10Y benchmark 6.60 6.00 6.50 10.00 1.75
10Y benchmark 4.48 1.23 4.37 5.31 3.55
Old 30Y benchmark 3.30 2.66 2.00 4.94 1.46
30Y benchmark 2.64 0.87 2.50 3.05 2.04
Note: Trade size reﬂects the average amount that was actually traded at the bid or ask each day between 0730h and 1700h
over the period from 25 February 2002 to 27 February 2003, and includes any order expansion that have may taken place
once the initial quote was hit or lifted (the “workup”).
Table 10: Correlation Coefﬁcients: Trade Size
2-year 5-year 10-year 30-year
2-year 1.00
5-year 0.36 1.00
10-year 0.53 0.40 1.00
30-year 0.45 0.23 0.30 1.00
Note: Correlation coefficients are calculated using weekly observations over the period 25 February
2002 to 27 February 2003.25
Table 11: Kyle (1)—Price impact of net number of trades
Mean Std. dev. Median 75% 25%
2-year 0.0629 0.0239 0.0578 0.0724 0.0488
5-year 0.1145 0.0352 0.1090 0.1310 0.0948
10-year 0.1753 0.1273 0.1607 0.1865 0.1319
30-year 0.1957 0.0655 0.1975 0.2453 0.1507
Notes: Price-impact coefﬁcients  are estimated for each week by regressing log changes in price on the
volume of buyer-initiated trades minus the volume of seller-initiated trades (NT) over each 5-minute interval between
0730h and 1700h. The mean coefﬁcient is the average of the weekly estimates from the period 25 February 2002 to
27 February 2003.
Table 12: Correlation Coefﬁcients: Kyle (1)—net number of trades
2-year 5-year 10-year 30-year
2-year 1.00
5-year 0.26 1.00
10-year 0.31 -0.02 1.00
30-year 0.26 0.17 0.04 1.00
Note: Correlation coefficients are calculated using weekly observations over the period 25 February




Pt () Pt 1 – () log – log b0 b1 NTt ´e t ++ =26
Table 13: Kyle (2)—Price impact of net trading volume
Mean Std. dev. Median 75% 25%
2-year 0.02044 0.01213 0.01812 0.02580 0.01316
5-year 0.06501 0.03755 0.06118 0.07375 0.04772
10-year 0.27699 0.39257 0.06025 0.66378 0.00000
30-year 0.35632 0.28709 0.30606 0.42586 0.17805
Notes: Price-impact coefﬁcients  are estimated for each week by regressing log changes in price on the
volume of buyer-initiated trades minus the volume of seller-initiated trades (NT) over each 5-minute interval between
0730h and 1700h. The mean coefﬁcient is the average of the weekly estimates from the period 25 February 2002 to
27 February 2003.
Table 14: Correlation Coefﬁcients: Kyle (2)—net trading volume
2-year 5-year 10-year 30-year
2-year 1.00
5-year -0.10 1.00
10-year 0.16 -0.04 1.00
30-year 0.09 0.03 -0.01 1.00
Note: Correlation coefficients are calculated using weekly observations over the period 25 February




Pt () Pt 1 – () log – log b0 b1 NTt ´e t ++ =27
Table 15: Proportion of Trades with Order Expansion (the “workup”)
Mean Std. dev. Median 75% 25%
Old 2Y benchmark 0.41 0.14 0.38 0.50 0.33
2Y benchmark 0.45 0.05 0.45 0.47 0.41
Old 5Y benchmark 0.50 0.37 0.50 0.71 0.14
5Y benchmark 0.41 0.05 0.41 0.45 0.37
Old 10Y benchmark 0.32 0.40 0.06 0.56 0.00
10Y benchmark 0.34 0.06 0.35 0.38 0.32
Old 30Y benchmark 0.49 0.35 0.50 0.77 0.24
30Y benchmark 0.32 0.05 0.32 0.37 0.29
Notes: Proportion of trades with order expansion (calculated weekly) is the number of trades where ﬁnal trade size is greater
than the initial quoted amount divided by the total number of trades for that week. The sample is the interval between 0730h
and 1700h over the period 25 February 2002 to 27 February 2003.
Table 16: Correlation Coefﬁcients: Proportion of Trades with Order Expansion
2-year 5-year 10-year 30-year
2-year 1.00
5-year 0.17 1.00
10-year 0.04 0.32 1.00
30-year 0.22 0.45 0.23 1.00
Note: Correlation coefficients are calculated using weekly observations over the period 25 February
2002 to 27 February 2003.28
Table 17: Proportion of Trading Volume for Trades with Order Expansion (the “workup”)
Mean Std. dev. Median 75% 25%
Old 2Y benchmark 0.67 0.24 0.76 0.86 0.53
2Y benchmark 0.75 0.06 0.75 0.79 0.71
Old 5Y benchmark 0.63 0.39 0.75 0.96 0.36
5Y benchmark 0.72 0.06 0.73 0.75 0.69
Old 10Y benchmark 0.44 0.46 0.26 0.99 0.00
10Y benchmark 0.65 0.09 0.68 0.71 0.63
Old 30Y benchmark 0.63 0.37 0.76 0.94 0.38
30Y benchmark 0.64 0.06 0.63 0.68 0.61
Notes: Proportion of trading volume with order expansion (calculated weekly) is the trading volume resulting from trades
where ﬁnal trade size is greater than the initial quoted amount divided by the total trading volume for that week. The sample
is the interval between 0730h and 1700h over the period 25 February 2002 to 27 February 2003.
Table 18: Correlation Coefﬁcients: Proportion of Trading Volume with Order Expansion
2-year 5-year 10-year 30-year
2-year 1.00
5-year 0.06 1.00
10-year 0.11 0.04 1.00
30-year 0.06 0.19 0.26 1.00
Note: Correlation coefficients are calculated using weekly observations over the period 25 February
2002 to 27 February 2003.29
Table 19: Correlation Coefﬁcients: Std. Dev. of Log Price Changes
2-year 5-year 10-year 30-year
2-year 1.00
5-year 0.73 1.00
10-year 0.67 0.53 1.00
30-year 0.74 0.67 0.72 1.00
Note: Daily standard deviation of logarithmic price changes over the period from 25 February
2002 to 27 February 2003.3
0
Table 20: Kyle—Regressions (using all 5-minute observations in sample) for Benchmarks







































0.0874 0.0219 0.0961 0.0333 0.1333 0.0414 0.0784 0.0221
DW 2.4783 2.4473 2.1898 2.1926 2.1630 2.1608 2.2258 2.2230
Observations 23738 23738 20906 20906 19514 19514 17208 17208
Notes: Price-impact coefﬁcients are estimated over the period from 25 February 2002 to 27 February 2003 by regressing log changes in price on (i) the
volume of buyer-initiated trades minus the volume of seller-initiated trades or (ii) the number of buyer-initiated trades minus the number of seller-
initiated trades over each 5-minute interval. . T-statistics in parentheses are calculated using
heteroscedastic-consistent (White) standard errors.
b1
Pt () Pt 1 – () log – log b0 b1 NTt ´e t ++ =31

























2Y benchmark 0.4435 0.7535 14.9630 30.2966
Old 2Y benchmark 0.4183 0.7500 22.1151 41.3683
5Y benchmark 0.4048 0.7204 12.9760 26.1160
Old 5Y benchmark 0.3915 0.7080 12.4652 26.3378
10Y benchmark 0.3509 0.6713 12.7907 25.1229
Old 10Y benchmark 0.3934 0.7697 11.16 25.5833
30Y benchmark 0.3191 0.6386 11.7939 25.1480
Old 30Y benchmark 0.4466 0.7337 12.7719 26.5870
Notes: Once a trade has been initiated at a particular price, other dealers may join in (on either side of the
trade) after the trading needs of the original buyer or seller have been met. The “workup” process
continues until either total buying or selling interest with respect to that trade has been satisﬁed.
Summary statistics are the sample means for all trades observed between 0730h and 1700h over the
period from 25 February 2002 to 27 February 2003.3
2






























Quote size 0.08 0.01 -0.17 1.00
Trade size 0.30 -0.08 -0.31 0.25 1.00
Kyle (1) -0.03 0.07 0.72 -0.15 -0.29 1.00
Kyle (2) -0.14 0.04 0.60 -0.25 -0.55 0.69 1.00
Workup (1) -0.02 -0.17 -0.27 0.02 0.37 -0.05 -0.06 1.00
Workup (2) -0.00 0.00 -0.11 -0.33 -0.04 0.09 0.01 0.55 1.00
Std. dev. 0.30 0.50 0.54 -0.11 -0.38 0.60 0.42 -0.28 -0.03 1.00
Note: Correlation coefﬁcients are calculated using weekly observations over the period 25 February 2002 to 27 February 2003.3
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Quote size 0.34 0.23 -0.23 1.00
Trade size 0.40 -0.06 -0.22 0.40 1.00
Kyle (1) -0.38 -0.43 0.61 -0.38 -0.12 1.00
Kyle (2) -0.40 -0.41 0.40 -0.39 -0.22 0.76 1.00
Workup (1) 0.19 -0.09 -0.04 -0.08 0.53 0.24 0.23 1.00
Workup (2) 0.13 0.02 -0.15 -0.32 0.23 0.24 0.17 0.52 1.00
Std. dev. 0.32 0.52 0.57 -0.00 -0.35 0.20 0.09 -0.19 -0.05 1.00
Note: Correlation coefﬁcients are calculated using weekly observations over the period 25 February 2002 to 27 February 2003.3
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Quote size 0.24 0.10 -0.39 1.00
Trade size 0.41 0.08 -0.25 0.45 1.00
Kyle (1) -0.27 -0.25 0.54 -0.25 -0.05 1.00
Kyle (2) -0.40 -0.37 0.55 -0.30 -0.15 0.96 1.00
Workup (1) 0.41 0.27 -0.40 0.32 0.55 -0.36 -0.49 1.00
Workup (2) 0.46 0.40 -0.45 0.13 0.36 -0.43 -0.55 0.85 1.00
Std. dev. 0.53 0.58 0.19 -0.10 0.00 -0.16 -0.30 0.26 0.38 1.00
Note: Correlation coefﬁcients are calculated using weekly observations over the period 25 February 2002 to 27 February 2003.3
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Quote size 0.04 -0.09 -0.38 1.00
Trade size 0.22 -0.19 -0.39 0.33 1.00
Kyle (1) -0.28 -0.25 0.49 -0.22 -0.16 1.00
Kyle (2) -0.23 -0.09 0.39 -0.39 -0.42 0.68 1.00
Workup (1) 0.08 -0.11 -0.01 -0.22 0.37 0.20 0.13 1.00
Workup (2) 0.18 0.01 -0.04 -0.19 0.33 0.05 -0.08 0.82 1.00
Std. dev. 0.22 0.40 0.38 -0.14 -0.47 0.17 0.29 -0.29 -0.13 1.00
Note: Correlation coefﬁcients are calculated using weekly observations over the period 25 February 2002 to 27 February 2003.36






Trading volume Can$0.496 billion US$6.65 billion 0.05
Trade frequency 41.7 trades/day 467.2 trades/day 0.09
Bid-ask spread Can$0.0212 US$0.007 2.02
Quote size Can$4.34 million US$24.5 million 0.12
Trade size Can$11.89 million US$14.2 million 0.56
Kyle (1) (net no. of trades) Can$0.00625 per tradea
a. Assuming a $100 face-value bond.
US$0.0016 per trade 2.6037
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Chart 3: Average intraday bid−ask spread for the 2−year benchmark (dollars per $100 face value)













Chart 4: Average intraday ask quote size − 2−year benchmark ($ millions)











Chart 6: Average intraday trade size − 2−year benchmark ($ millions)








Chart 5: Average intraday bid quote size − 2−year benchmark ($ millions)















Chart 6: Average intraday trade size − 2−year benchmark ($ millions)









Chart 7: Average intraday trading volume of "worked up" trades − 2−year benchmark ($ millions)
















Chart 9: Proportion of trading volume from "worked up" trades − 2−year benchmark ($ millions)
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Chart 10: Proportion of trades "worked up" − 2−year benchmark ($ millions)
7:00am  5:00pm      12:00pm42
Appendix A: Filtering the Data
The raw data ﬁles from CanPX feature signiﬁcant repetition, with identical lines of information
appearing multiple times in some cases. In addition, there are user input errors that can
signiﬁcantly bias the results if not excluded. To deal with “bad quotes,” our ﬁltering process
excludes two-sided quotes with a bid-ask spread of greater than 75 basis point (bps) or lesser than
-10 bps, absolute 5-minute price changes larger than 0.9 per cent, and absolute 5-minute price
changes that feature prices outside a plausible range.
The midpoint of the bid and ask quotes in a two-sided market is taken as the “market price.”
Although one-sided quote observations are retained to calculate average quote size (one of our
liquidity measures), only observations that have two-sided quotes are considered with respect to
prices.
A.1 Constructing the Benchmark Series
During our sample period, a switch in benchmarks occurs three times for the 2-year sector, twice
for the 5-year sector, and once for the 10-year sector. It is necessary to create a rule for each sector
that identifies the current and previous benchmark on each day. We follow convention by identifying
a change in benchmark status based on the ﬁnal auction at which that security’s cumulative
issuance crosses into the specified range of $7 to $10 billion for the 2-year sector, $9 to $12 billion
for the 5-year sector, and $12 to $15 billion for the 10-year and 30-year sectors. For example, the
5-year benchmark was deﬁned as 5.75 per cent September 2006 for the period of 25 February
2002 until the auction on 14 August 2002, at which time 4.5 per cent September 2007 was
reopened for the fourth and final time, bringing cumulative issuance to $10.4 billion. On 14 August
2002, 4.5 per cent September 2007 became the current 5-year benchmark, while 5.75 per cent
September 2006 was relegated to “old” benchmark status for the purposes of our dataset.
Although these benchmark transition points are consistent with the Government of Canada’s debt
issuance calendar, it is important to note that the market’s perception of a change in benchmark
status is actually a matter of consensus, rather than according to a strict rule. The result is that
trading and quotation activity in the “new” benchmark may actually lag behind activity in the
“old” benchmark for a period of days or weeks following the auction at which benchmark status
“ofﬁcially” changes, as market participants switch over to trading the new security. In those
sectors where a new benchmark is created relatively infrequently (such as the 30-year sector), the
current and previous benchmarks may share the stage in this way for a signiﬁcant period of time.43
A.2 Missing Data1
Whereas each of the IDBs that supply data to CanPX can feature quotes on a relatively large
number of securities over the course of a trading day, the CanPX system displays consolidated
information only with respect to a subset that consists of those considered to be most liquid. In
general, CanPX displays information regarding two or three benchmark or near-benchmark
securities in each of the maturity sectors. Unfortunately, although each sector’s current identiﬁed
benchmark is nearly always represented on CanPX, the identity of the second or third security
shown in each sector can vary.
Immediately following a change in benchmark status, the second bond shown is typically the
most recent benchmark. As time goes on, however, and the bond that will be the next benchmark
is issued and grows in size, this prospective benchmark may take the place of the old benchmark
alongside the current benchmark on the CanPX screen. Therefore, the “old benchmark”
composite series in each sector may contain a number of missing days.
1. Missing days, 10-year benchmark only: 6 September 2002 to4 October 2002.Bank of Canada Working Papers
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